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Traditionalist forbidding of wrong
in ‘Abbasid Baghdad1
AV SUSANNE OLSSON
Artikkelen omhandler den formative perioden av juridiske tra-
disjoner i ‘Abbasidenes Bagdad, med særlig fokus på “tra-
disjonalisme”, hvor Ibn Hanbal (d. 855) var en forløper. Fokus
er på konﬂiktsituasjonen relatert til tolkningen av islam, spesielt
på 900-tallet, da ﬂere konﬂikter førte til vold og opptøyer i byen.
Formålet er å vise hvordan noen av Tradisjonalistene søkte å dis-
kreditere andre islamtolkninger og praksiser, og å belyse deres
syn på hvordan ikke-tradisjonalister skulle behandles ifølge deres
forståelse av plikten til å “forby det onde”. Bagdad er konteksten,
og den sosiale, økonomiske og politiske situasjonen i byen
fungerer som en forklarende bakgrunn for de tolkninger og kon-
ﬂikter som blir nevnt i artikkelen. Etter at uroen og volden er ad-
ressert, gis noen korte kommentarer til årsakene til at en
mer”passiv” hanbalisme siden har dominert. Dette i forhold til
oppfatninger av hvordan man i praksis skulle behandle de som
ikke var hanbalitter. 
NØKKELORD: Tradisjonalisme, hanbalisme, forby det onde, Bagdad,
Abbasider
1 Håkan Rydving was one of my teachers while a student at Bergen University, and he
supervised my MA-thesis. His inspiring and supportive style of supervising and
teaching has influenced me ever since and he has always encouraged and inspired my
research interests in Islam as a political factor until today, and for which I am
immensely grateful.
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INLEDNING
This article addresses Traditionalism2 in Baghdad with a focus on how
certain early Hanbalis viewed the duty of commanding right and for-
bidding wrong (al-amr bi al-maʻrūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar, see
below). It outlines Ibn Hanbal’s (750–855) rather passive views on how
to correct wrongdoers and what kind of methods he promoted and
practiced in this regard, and relates this to the historical situation in
Baghdad at the time. Ibn Hanbal’s views and method of correction will
mainly be drawn from the biography by Ibn al-Jawzi (see below).
Following the examples of the biography, the article will brieﬂy address
the development of Hanbalism in regards to forbidding wrong during
the 10th century, putting later Hanbalis under scrutiny in order to address
what kind of correction they promoted and practiced.  This part will
thus comment on the development of the Hanbali tradition regarding
the forbidding of wrong during the century after Ibn Hanbal’s death,
when the context had changed. The focus is on how the selected
Traditionalists advocated forbidding of wrong and a comparison will
be made of their strategies. The main proponents of the forbidding of
wrong that will be compared is al-Barbahari (867–941), who re-
presented an activist stance, and al-Khallal (ca 848–923), who re-
presented a passive stance. Where possible, a comment will be made
on how they conducted the forbidding of wrong in practice, and an
attempt at an explanation will be made related to the historical situation.
The purpose is not to outline dogmatic reasons to motivate the rejection
of speciﬁc groups or positions. Dissimilation efforts often appear in
situations where religious authority is contested. The use of “tradition”
is typically arising in situations where conﬂicts and contested claims to
religious authority appear. The Traditionalist approach to sources serve
a purpose of legitimization and one strategic function of the requirement
of textual evidence is to formulate distinct identities and to draw clear
2 In this article, “Traditionalism” designates interpretations of Scripture promoting a
condemnation of methods and arguments based on reason as in speculative theology
(kalām) or philosophy, and instead requiring direct textual proof from the Qur’an or
Sunnah. Traditionalism here refers to early forms of Hanbalism, emphasizing strict
adherence to and imitation of the Sunnah.
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boundaries between in- and out-group (Rüpke 2011). This article will
comment on possible reasons why a passive practice of forbidding
wrong became dominant. We will begin with turning to the city of
Baghdad herself, whose economic, social and political situation is the
context of this formative period, in order to gain a context from which
we can understand the sources.
‘ABBASID BAGHDAD
Baghdad was founded in 762 by the caliph Mansur (r. 754–775) and
turned into a major center of learning. It was a ﬂowering city, and parts
of the local population were rather afﬂuent. Worldly attractions led to
what many considered un-Islamic behavior, with arenas for music,
games and dancing girls. Urbanization and commerce led people of
diverse backgrounds to intermingle, and quests for knowledge of
various sorts were patronized by the authorities. Baghdad has since been
remembered as the main site for the so-called golden age of Islam,
where science, culture, philosophy and inventions ﬂowered, until the
Mongol invasion in 1258. 
Three features characterized the cultural climate of Baghdad, at least
regarding the cultural elite, namely individualism, cosmopolitanism,
and secularism. The atmosphere has been described as competitive and
individuals strove for fame and recognition. The cosmopolitan nature
was expressed in pluralism of religious, ethnic, and cultural back-
grounds of its people, including visiting merchants and scholars. The
allegiance with traditional groups and loyalties were weakened as a
result, but most people seem to have attempted to, at least formally,
maintain allegiance with their religious communities. This is likely the
result of the prevalent strong social and religious norms that conﬂicted
with the ideals of many scholars, who therefore needed to pretend and
accommodate to the norms (Kraemer 1986:11–20, 24–25, 30). 
Life for the common people was hard. It was difﬁcult to supply
sufﬁcient facilities for the large population, estimated to around
300.000–500.000 individuals. Services and the municipal administ-
115
1/2018
ration were not effective. Famine, malnutrition, epidemics, wars, and a
general feeling of insecurity due to urban rioting and foreign invasions
were widespread, causing a “hypersensitivity of temperament” among
both leaders and the populace. In addition to such emotions, social,
religious and ideological antagonism and aggressiveness characterized
the city. This divided the Muslims in various fractions, unable to unite
in the face of outside aggressors (Kraemer 1986:21–27, 46–47).
The ‘Abbasid caliphs inﬂuenced the development of Islamic
theology and jurisprudence in various ways. A well-known incident is
when the caliph al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833) initiated the inquisition
(mihnah) in 833. Al-Ma’mun sent a letter to his deputy telling him to
control the judges concerning their views on the Qur’an. The letter
shows al-Ma’mun’s critical attitude towards the Traditionalists. The
common people with a lack of knowledge, he held, were mistaken in
their view of the eternal Qur’an, in reference to Q12:2, “We have made
it (ja‘alnahu) an Arabic Koran”, arguing that what God has made
(ja‘ala), he has created (khalaka). Moreover, the caliph turns against
Traditionalists due to their focus on Sunnah and rejection of others.
The inquisition constituted of a struggle between those who held a
rationalistic approach to theology and jurisprudence, and Traditionalists,
who stressed textual evidence (dalīl)  and condemned speculative
theology (kalām) (on mihnah, see Hinds 2012). These differences also
had political consequences during mihnah, when the caliph enforced
certain theological dogma as ofﬁcial, and scholars were expected to
accept them. The dogma related to rationalist creed, such as stressing
free will and individual responsibility, as well as divine justice and the
createdness of the Qur’an. These dogmas outraged Traditionalists who
stressed predestination (qadar) and argued that the Qur’an is the eternal
word of the almighty God. In the midst of the conﬂict, we ﬁnd Ahmad
ibn Hanbal, who followed the Traditionalist line of requiring textual
evidence. The inquisition lasted during the reign of al-Ma’mun and his
successors, al-Mu‘tasim (r. 833–842) and al-Wathiq (r. 842–847), to be
ended early in the reign of al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861). The end of
mihnah also had the consequence that the caliphal authorities no longer
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were in charge of deﬁning Islam. Thus, the scholars upheld “spiritual
authority” as inheritors of the prophets (warathat al-anbiyā’), and the
caliphs upheld temporal authority (Hinds 2012). However, relationships
between the “spiritual” and temporal have always been negotiated
throughout history, not least due to legitimacy reasons.
The reign of al-Muqtadir (r. 908–932) brought the ‘Abbasid caliphate
to a low with widespread turbulence and losses of areas, and the
‘Abbasid power began to be reduced to nominal authority with other
ofﬁcers de facto in charge. In Baghdad, people were demoralized and
certain Hanbalis took to violence in the streets (Muir 1915:567–568). 
One aspect to keep in mind is the fact that the caliphate gradually lost
hold on power, while Shiites increased their inﬂuence, which is more
apparent during the 10th century. Then, the caliph al-Radi (r. 934–940)
attempted to weaken Traditionalists, who caused a turbulent period
during his reign, when the ‘Abbasid power declined and fears of Shiite
inﬂuence grew when the Buyids (945–1055) rose to power in the East
and successively gained control over ‘Abbasid authorities. ‘Abbasid
power fragmented due to external dynasties challenging its power.
“During the long period from the Būyid occupation of Bāg̲h̲dād to the
conquest of the city by the Mongols, the Caliphate became a purely
titular institution, representing the headship of Sunnī Islam, and acting
as legitimating authority for the numerous secular rulers who exercised
effective sovereignty, both in the provinces and in the capital” (Lewis
2012).
TRADITIONALIST SENTIMENTS
Traditionalist sentiments developed and grew strong early in the
‘Abbasid era. Hanbalis were strongly motivated and opposed everyone
considered wrongdoers. They did not only attempt to combat immoral
behavior, but also rejected rational methodology, categorizing it as
heresy. Early Hanbalis have been described as constituting a juridical-
theological and social movement, unlike the other more established
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Sunni madhāhib and Hanbalism functioned very much as an opposition
party (Kraemer 1986:60).
Hanbalism had support among the urban masses. This was probably
caused by Hanbali resistance to Shiism in the face of the declining
caliphate. During the 10th century, some Hanbalis became aggressive
and their methods of forbidding wrong gained popular support (Muir
1915:570). Their view of being morally superior formed group identity
and supported a division of people into “us” and “them”. The advocated
mode of conduct can be referred to as “Traditionalist resistance”, which
includes advocating moral chastisement through the duty of “command-
ing good and forbidding wrong”. Ibn Hanbal’s views were passive and
non-violent. However, at times Hanbalis included violence as a method
of correction. Traditionalists represented a moral vision connected to
social activism regarding correction of ordinary people, but
simultaneously most promoted political quietism, since the majority of
the Hanbali community accepted the creed of being loyal to political
authorities (Bosworth 2012). 
As Michael Cook notes, the Qur’anic text seems to imply a verbal
duty when referring to both “commanding” and “forbidding” (Cook
2001:34. See also Cook 2012 and Pines 2012).3 This is not the case
when the Prophetic tradition is considered. An often referred tradition
presents the duty in a three-fold manner, which Cook calls the “three
modes tradition” of deed, word and thought (Cook 2001:33). The
Hanbalis understood the duty as moral activism in public space, which
in their view the caliphs no longer did, and they took up responsibility
to perform this duty (Hurvitz 2011:49). 
3 The conjunction of “commanding right” and “forbidding wrong” is found in the Qur’an,
for example: “Let there be one nation of you, calling to good, and bidding to honour,
and forbidding dishonour; those are the prosperers”. Q3:104 (Arberry). See also
Q3:110, 114; Q7:157; Q9:71, 112; Q22:41; Q31:17. See Cook 2001:13. Cook 2001,
chapter 3 (“Tradition”), gives several examples from the Sunnah where the phrase
appears. Cook 2001 presents how the phrase has been central in Islamic thinking
throughout history until the modern era, in both rationalist and Traditionalist thinking.
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AHMAD IBN HANBAL
Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855) condemned speculative theology and
acknowledged the Qur’an and Sunnah as the only authentic sources of
true knowledge. He has been described as “a man whose peculiar
temperament disposed him not only of the kind of life which he lived –
intense, ascetic, and ﬁerce in its protest against liberalism, - but also to
those views and beliefs which were, to a certain extent, the springs of
such a life” (Patton 2010:183). He led an ascetic life, and strived to
avoid any connections to the caliphal court, and refused royal gifts of-
fered him at various instances. He also refused to accept ofﬁcial
positions as teacher and jurist. In the biography by Abu al-Faraj ibn al-
Jawzi (1116–1201), Ibn Hanbal’s ascetic persona is vividly described.
The biography is thematically organized and functions very much as a
hagiographic text where the piety of Ibn Hanbal is stressed. It is im-
portant to keep in mind while reading his works that Ibn al-Jawzi was
state-friendly and recommended that one should avoid admonishing the
leaders. Cook holds that he represents the culmination of Hanbali
“fence-mending” with the political authorities (Cook 2001:141). 
In the biography, Ibn al-Jawzi characterizes Ibn Hanbal as a humble
and pious man, who completely trusted in God. He hesitated to keep
even some small coins, fearing that it would be an expression of
hesitance as to whether God actually would provide for the true be-
lievers. His son Salih reportedly said: “One day my father said to me,
‘When there’s not a single coin in the house, I’m happy”’ (Ibn al-Jawzi
41:17. See also Ibn al-Jawzi 44:15). Ibn Hanbal is portrayed as loving
poverty. He is reported to having said: “Nothing does as much good as
poverty – nothing! When there’s no money here I rejoice” (Ibn al-Jawzi
51:3).
Furthermore, Ibn Hanbal was uncompromising in his view that
Sunnah should guide Muslims in each historical setting (Ibn al-Jawzi
44:15). His stubbornness led the caliph to order him to be whipped,
after striving hard to make him admit even the slightest notion of the
createdness of the Qur’an. As Michael Cooperson holds, Ibn Hanbal
must have been aware that his reliance on the Qur’an and Sunnah
119
1/2018
equaled denying the caliph’s authority (Cooperson 2013:xv). When he
was brought in for interrogation, he refused to admit the dogma of the
created Qur’an, but that is not all; “he refused absolutely to recognize
the validity of their proofs, and maintained a stubborn silence” (Patton
2010:105-106). Ibn Hanbal was ﬂogged but later on released, and he
was not brought in for trial again, most likely due to the fear of the
caliph of a popular uprising (Patton 2010:112). That the caliph let him
go is explained by Ibn al-Jawzi as a gesture of fearing an outburst of
violence (Ibn al-Jawzi 69:56). His popularity is also shown in that the
caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861) attempted to employ him and offered
him several grants. Ibn Hanbal attended the caliphal court repeatedly,
but the biographies tell that he did not appreciate it. He never directly
refused the invitations but persistently excused himself. He accepted
grants, but gave them away as sadaqah (voluntary charity). The caliph
eventually sent him a message which released him from the obligation
to appear before him (Ibn al-Jawzi 73. See also Patton 2010:145–146). 
From this background, it may be easier to understand the strategies
of forbidding wrong. Later Hanbalis became infamous due to their
attempts at “correcting” others. Ibn Hanbal wished to “correct” the
immoral behavior of others too, but he promoted a “passive resistance”.
One example is that he refused to eat food cooked in his son’s oven,
since he had accepted a caliphal grant (Ibn al-Jawzi 49.13, 49.20). Coo-
person refers to this as being due to “horror of ritual pollution”, equaling
it to warā’, in the sense of scrupulousness or scrupulosity. Cooperson
holds that wara’ meant renouncing luxury (Cooperson 2013:xii-xiii; see
also Urvoy 2012).
The biography presents Ibn Hanbal’s strategy as forbidding wrongs
“in the heart”. As previously indicated, this passive method changed
with later Hanbalis. In the following, I will give a brief presentation of
the conﬂicts of interpretations of the Hanbali creed, mainly through the
ﬁgures of al-Barbahari and al-Khallal, who seem to have dominated
two “parties” of Hanbalis during the 10th century.
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FORBIDDING OF WRONG IN THE 10TH CENTURY
Apart from Ibn Hanbal, textual sources referring to later periods do not
give much evidence of how forbidding wrong was practiced. After a
time of relative quietude, Hanbalis reached the surface in the 10th
century through what Cook calls “notorious troublemakers”, where al-
Barbahari (867–941) is described as a preacher and demagogue (Cook
2001:116). In Cook’s words, a “muscular” Hanbali “violence was
rampant on the streets of Baghdad” during the 10th century (Cook
2001:116). The activity is documented throughout the Buyids (945–
1055) and far into the Seljuk period (1055–1194). Cook notes that our
available sources from the 10th century appear as records of “high
principles” and “high drama”, but not “much of the daily round of for-
bidding wrong” (Cook 2001:114). Hanbali agitation decreases later on,
which coincides with a closer tie being established with the ‘Abbasid
state, which lasts until 1258.
Joel L. Kraemer describes al-Barbahari as being highly inﬂuential,
causing urban unrest, and supporting the persecution of al-Tabari (838–
923) (Kraemer 1986:61). Al-Barbahari agitated against all whom he
considered committing innovation (bid‘ah), and his method of
correction was hands on. Among his “others” he included Shiites, Suﬁs
and dogmatic theologians, also targeting “ordinary Muslims” not abid-
ing to a Hanbali lifestyle. He was a charismatic leader who conducted
a pietistic struggle to transfer his view of a moral vision on society,
which erupted in violence and drew immediate attention from the
authorities. His struggle must be understood related to the context of
Baghdad during his time, after the mihnah and the many interpretations
of Islam that ﬂourished. Christopher Melchert holds that Hanbalis at
the time of al-Barbahari exaggerated Ibn Hanbal’s accomplishments
due to their wish to compete with the other juridical traditions that were
being established, notably the Shaﬁ‘i madhhab, and particularly the
Hanaﬁ madhhab who grew stronger and were favored early during the
‘Abbasids (Melchert 1997:152–153). Hence, the behavior on behalf of
the Traditionalists can be understood as part of an internal power
struggle.
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The caliphate was invested with executive power but they were in
need of religious legitimacy. Therefore, the jurists managed to keep
their relevance, but as seen, most early Hanbalis attempted to stay clear
of the caliphal court, but still impacted on society due to popular
support. In her forthcoming article “al-madhhab al-jarīrī: Natural Law
Theory, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law in an Islamic School of
Law”, Ulrika Mårtensson discusses that the positions held on the Qur’an
during mihnah have been interpreted as having political implications.
The dogma of the created Qur’an, established as a state doctrine, trans-
ferred the interpretive and legislative authority to the caliph, removing
it from the jurists. After mihnah, the caliph continued to be the symbol
of Muslim unity and the ofﬁcial head, but not the source of religious
belief. The religious scholars developed independently of the state and
held “a more complete authority over the communal personal, religious
and doctrinal aspects of Islam” (Lapidus 1996:12). Their sources of
authority were the Qur’an and Sunnah, not caliphal pronouncements.
“The traditionists expected the caliph to uphold the truth and law, but
not to deﬁne its content, because as the ultimate object of Muslim
devotion, the law stood beyond the Caliph” (Lapidus 1975:382–383).
Hanbalis mounted popular demonstrations during the 10th century.
Their actions were often directed against another Islamic position which
they rejected, such as Shiites or followers of speciﬁc individuals, such
as al-Tabari (Mottahedeh 2001:24–25). The Hanbalis are said to have
been angry at al-Tabari because he did not include Ibn Hanbal as one
of the great jurists, and al-Tabari was according to some sources buried
secretly in his house at night, in order to avoid tumult (Muir 1915:568,
note 1). Melchert writes: “It would seem to have been al-Barbahārī’s
faction that persecuted the polymath al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) during al-
Khallāl’s lifetime” (Melchert 1997:152). Franz Rosenthal questions
whether that was actually the case and he holds that “The role of
Ḥanbalite hostility, though real, seems to have been exaggerated in
connection with his death as it was in his life” (Rosenthal 1989:78).
Still, several sources address it in this manner, which of course may be
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a Hanbali reconstruction, as part of a strategy to seek authority and
reducing the inﬂuence of opponents. 
Even though al-Tabari shared many views with the Traditionalists,
such as the need of text-based laws and the doctrine of the uncreated
Qur’an (Mårtensson 2016), the relationship between them seem to have
been everything but good. Mårtensson mentions that Hanbalis
attempted to prevent students attending his lectures on the Qur’an
(2016:10). One reason may be that al-Tabari reserved the title amīr al-
mu’minīn (commander of the faithful) for ‘Ali, above ‘Umar. This
would not have been strategic if he intended to silence Hanbali critique
(Mårtensson 2016:10). The relationship between al-Tabari and the
Hanbalis is also commented upon by Rosenthal in the general
introduction to al-Tabari’s Ta’rīkh. It will be mentioned here since it
addresses the situation and the status of the Hanbalis at this time.
Rosenthal argues that the struggle may be a consequence of al-Tabari’s
independent judgement in matters of law. He states that anyone insisting
on giving independent judgements “could expect to encounter
determined hostility” (Rosenthal 1989:71). The relationship with the
Hanbalis is described as having had an important and disturbing impact
on al-Tabari’s life. 
As mentioned, the enmity is presented as likely due to al-Tabari
omitting Ibn Hanbal from a publication on jurists (ikthilāf). Allegedly,
al-Tabari’s opinion was that Ibn Hanbal was not a jurist but (merely) a
scholar of hadīth. He had also expressed elsewhere that he did not see
anyone transmit legal opinions from Ibn Hanbal. Rosenthal notes that
al-Tabari may not have addressed these issues in public, but that the
Hanbalis probably held suspicions about his views about their madhhab.
However, Rosenthal also notes that the context is an important factor
in order to understand the hostilities. During this time, the Hanbalis
were not as established as the other juridical madhāhib and wished to
promote themselves. Al-Tabari was a great jurist well connected with
the state administration and he developed an independent legal method,
crystallizing into madhhab Jarīrī (Mårtensson 2016:19). Al-Tabari and
other individuals of prominence were likely considered rivals, and
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among the Hanbalis at this time were those who did not reject the use
of violence (Rosenthal 1989:63-71). Rosenthal also mentions al-
Barbahari in the introduction, and holds that his name was never
mentioned in connection with al-Tabari in the sources, but he states that
“he probably must be seen as the person behind much of it” (Rosenthal
1989:72). 
As an example of how correction could look like in practice, the
following will mainly focus on the approach to Shiites on behalf of the
Barbaharians, not least because this is explicitly addressed in his-
toriographical sources. Al-Barbahari is mentioned in the ﬁrst volume
of the chronicles by historian Ibn Miskawayh (932–1030), Tajārib al-
umam (Experiences of nations), where he is described as the head of
the Hanbalis (ra’īs al-hanbaliya), and it is written that he was arrested
together with some of his supporters and they were sent to Basra by
boat. The chronicles explains that it was the result of popular agitation,
following an incident when a courtier proposed that the Umayyad caliph
Mu‘awiya should be cursed in mosques (Ibn Miskawayh 1920:260–
261). This caused unrest, which is understandable considering that it
was a political issue. The Shiites were critical of Mu‘awiya due to his
opposing ‘Ali and establishing the Umayyad dynasty. Naturally, cursing
him would outrage Sunnis, especially Traditionalists, and as a result
they took to the streets (see Hurvitz 2011:44). 
Al-Barbahari went into hiding after the chief of the police in
Baghdad decided in 935 that al-Barbahari’s followers were not allowed
to meet and some of them were imprisoned. This was two years after
the cursing proposal. The explanation given in the chronicles to their
arrest is their assaults on people (Ibn Miskawayh 1920:322). It is not
clear what actually started the unrest, whether it was the courtiers or
generals or the rumor spread about the cursing of Mu‘awiya, but the
chronicles agree that the caliph and Hanbalis were on a collision course,
which was at its peak between 930–939 (Hurvitz 2011:45. See also Mel-
chert 1997:150–152). 
Although al-Barbahari was hiding, and some Hanbalis deported, the
unrest continued. The Hanbalis looted shops in 935, attacked wine
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sellers, singing girls and they smashed musical instruments. They put a
Shiite quarter in Baghdad on ﬁre, following the arrest of one of al-
Barbahari’s followers (Hurvitz 2011:48). In 939 they molested people
going to festivities at a mosque (Melchert 1997:151. See also Cook
2001, chapter 6). They “broke into homes, poured out wine, smashed
musical instruments, and even interrogated couples on the street to as-
sure that they were conducting themselves properly” (Kraemer
1986:61). Al-Radi even issued an edict that condemned Hanbalis for
promoting anthropomorphism, for molesting other Muslims and accus-
ing Shiites of inﬁdelity. They were also accused of inviting to veneration
by the tomb of Ibn Hanbal, simultaneously as they condemned the
Shiites for pilgrimage to the tombs of the Imams (Kraemer 1986:61–
62). In 941, his followers attempted to destroy a Shiite mosque and
attacked money changers and bankers. A month later al-Barbahari died
from hemorrhage (qiyām al-dam), and was secretly buried in the house
where he hid (Melchert 1997:151). 
The Barbaharians thus caused rioting in the streets as a part of their
activist hands-on forbidding of wrong and as a result, they were on a
constant collision course with the caliphal authorities. This was not a
successful strategy and as we shall see, this kind of behavior did not
continue.
DEVELOPMENT OF QUIETISM
We may ask why the Hanbali madhhab did not spread as the others.
One reason is that it developed later and did not produce many judges.
We should note though that Ibn Hanbal’s son Salih (d. 980) took up a
position as judge, unwillingly but forced to due to debts. However, this
attitude had changed with Abu Ya‘la ibn al-Farra’ (990–1066). He
vitalized the Hanbalis and brought forth a systematic legal framing
(Cook 2001:123) As seen, Ibn Hanbal refused to take any ofﬁcial
position, which seems to have been the rule among early Traditionalists.
Moreover, later Hanbali use of violence, severity and fanaticism
alienated people, “especially in forbidding the bad as under al-
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Barbahārī” (Melchert 1997:153). Melchert argues that other reasons can
be added, such as the fact that many students arrived in Baghdad who
came from afﬂuent classes, who would not appreciate the Barbaharian
way of correcting others (Melchert 1997:154). 
Melchert notes that: “[t]he street-ﬁghting Ḥanbalism of al-Barbahārī
lasted for some time, but it was al-Khallāls semi-rationalist
jurisprudence that led to Ibn Taymīyah and the survival of Ḥanbali
vitality into modern times” (Melchert 1997:155). And it is to Abu Bakr
al-Khallal (ca 848–923) that we shall turn next. Melchert holds that “al-
Barbahārī’s program of violent opposition to these disturbers of public
decorum went directly against al-Khallāl’s teaching. Enforcement of
morality by private parties had long been termed enjoining the good
and forbidding the bad” (Melchert 1997:151). There is nothing that
indicates that al-Khallal would have approved of wine and singing girls
and the like, but, unlike the Barbaharians, he “discouraged active
interference” (Melchert 1997:151). This called for a more quietist ap-
proach, and one that did not cause the attention of the caliphal court.
Not much is known about al-Khallal apart from him being a jurist
among Ibn Hanbal’s students, and that he compiled responses by Ibn
Hanbal. In the biography of Ibn al-Jawzi on Ibn Hanbal, al-Khallal is
described as very dedicated to collecting Ibn Hanbal’s knowledge
(‘ulūm) (Ibn al-Jawzi 100:22). Through al-Khallal, masā’il were
collected from vast geographical areas and he is credited with several
writings. Most of them have not survived, but are cited by well-known
scholars, such as Ibn Taymiya (1263–1328) and some of his students
(Ahmad 1970:248). Al-Khallal is thus credited with preserving the
teaching of Ibn Hanbal. He is described as a great authority during his
time (Ahmad 1970:245–247). Due to him, the Hanbali madhhab formed
into a tradition like the other madhāhib (Melchert 1997:137, 143–147).
The duty of forbidding wrong has been thoroughly analyzed by
Cook, who notes that there are textual sources bearing on this duty.
However, these do not provide detailed descriptions of daily practice.
Cook notes though that the exception is the early period when
Hanbalism took shape. From this time, responsa exist that address
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concerns of an everyday life character. He also notes that Hanbalis were
not theoretically interested but rather concrete and speciﬁc, which has
a bearing on the responsa (Cook 2001:87).
Among the collections of al-Khallal is a treatise on Ibn Hanbal’s
views on forbidding wrong. The treatise is very much a repetition of
Ibn Hanbal’s passive stance. It does not call for violence. Rather, one
should forbid wrong in private. But if confronted with wine, one should
pour it out. However, a sealed container with wine should not be dis-
turbed. One should not actively search for wine or interfere with those
selling wine under the protection of the caliph. Upon seeing musical in-
struments, they should be broken, but one should not seek the source if
hearing drumming or singing (Melchert 1997:151). 
Al-Khallal’s treatise brings some illuminating aspects on forbidding
wrong. Cook notes that most examples refer to wine, women and song.
One feature is that one should admonish and forbid the offender, and
the stance of leaving authorities (sultān) out is explicit (Cook 2001:90.
For an extensive presentation of the treatise, see Cook 2001, chapter 5
“Ibn Hanbal”). One reason to leave authorities out is that one cannot be
sure what kind of punishment they will impose on the offender. It may
be too much or too little, and the risk of the authorities being brutal is
vital. Cook illustrates that the treatise can be arranged on a continuum
from the public sphere to the intimate sphere of the privacy of people’s
homes. Drinking in public or quietly at home are very different matters
and should be corrected differently (Cook 2001:93–94). This attitude
was most likely not considered a threat to the authorities, which may
explain why it grew more popular and became the dominant strategy.
The responses to offences that appear in al-Khallal’s treatise are not
explicitly stated however, and there is no evidence of how it was
conducted in practice by al-Khallal or his supporters. However, it seems
that all adults had this duty of forbidding wrong. It also seems that Ibn
Hanbal accepted performance of forbidding wrong with the heart as
“easement” (tashīl), even though some kind of action seems to have
been preferred (Cook 2001:95). Cook’s reading of the treatise suggests
that “with the heart” means nothing more than an “unobservable mental
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act” (Cook 2001:96). He holds that the “default mode” of commanding
and forbidding is with the tongue, normally in a civil fashion. Rudeness
is only accepted when a wrongdoer (fāsiq) does not listen to the
correcting person – and calling someone fāsiq is considered speaking
rudely in the responsa (Cook 2001:96). However, to correct with the
hands is also present. One example is the destruction of objects deemed
offensive, such as instruments or containers of wine, but only when con-
fronted with such objects in public. Another is action directed to the
offender, but the level of violence is low. One example is separating
ﬁghting boys in the street. Another is simply to remove yourself from
the scene where you confront offence. Cooke exempliﬁes with when
you hear a drum and cannot break it, you can simply leave (Cook
2001:97). Furthermore, correcting others appears to be an individual
duty, but you may bring helpers. Ibn Hanbal suggested making a fuss
to draw a crowd to help in preventing an offence, such as when you
encounter someone playing music (Cook 2001:98).
Another question addressed in the treatise is when one should not
perform the duty. Cook notes that there are three reasons that can be
deduced, namely when you fear for your safety, when the offender
ignores your corrections after repeated attempts, and the third is related
to the demands of privacy. Heroism, or martyrdom, is neither expected
nor recommended (Cook 2001:98–99). As Cook stressed, the examples
in the treatise show that privacy is stressed and that the duty must relate
to that, and “[t]his severely limits any kind of gate-crashing of people’s
homes” (Cook 2001:99). This follows the dictum “Do not investigate
what is not out in the open (mā ghāba)” (Cook 2001:100). This is a
different approach than that of the Barbaharians. It is this passive stance
that has dominated Hanbalism after the 10th century, and which follows
the example of Ibn Hanbal. This strategy seems to have been tolerated
by the authorities as well which may explain its continuation and es-
tablishment as the dominant Hanbali view.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Thus, we can note Ibn Hanbal’s apolitical and passive stance towards
the duty of forbidding wrong, and that there seems to have been
different Traditionalist strategies during the 10th century. There is no
evidence of a united Hanbali madhhab during the 10th century. Al-
Khallal and al-Barbahari seem to have been heading two of the
Traditionalist parties. There is mentioning of three parties in the sources.
The Hanbali theologian Ibn Battah (916–997), who knew al-Barbahari,
relates that a follower of al-Barbahari passed a heretic scofﬁng at “these
Hanbalis”. The Barbaharian said that there were three kinds of Hanbalis:
“the type of the ascetics, who fast and pray; a type who write [hadīth]
and learn jurisprudence; and a type who slap every scoffer like you,”
and then he slapped him (Melchert 1997:150). Another distinction be-
tween the two is that al-Khallal promoted a Traditionalism of ela-
boration of legal doctrine, while al-Barbahari rather promoted
Traditionalism as a style of public life (Melchert 1997:150). Melchert
mentions that he did not bring up al-Barbahari in his history of Hanbali
jurisprudence because his contributions seem to be negligible and he
found no references to his juridical opinions. Rather, al-Barbahari is
described as becoming famous due to rioting (Melchert 1997:150). This
is perhaps the case, and there is no evidence that al-Khallal did support
any of the urban unrest caused by other Hanbalis. We should also note
that the formal and systematic accounts that we have from later
Hanbalis seem to promote a stance similar to that of Ibn Hanbal. If we
only had these sources, we would not be able to say anything about
what was going on in the streets (Cook 2001:138). This is apparent in
Sharh al-Sunnah by al-Barbahari in which he does not call for any
explicit action towards wrongdoers, but rather provides examples of the
strategy of avoiding wrongdoers (such as not sitting with them). The
advocated correction very much resembles Ibn Hanbal’s passive stance
(al-Barbahari 2014. See also Cook 2001:128). The image of al-
Barbahari and his followers as rioters and forbidding evil hands on is
thus based on the descriptions found in later historiographical sources.
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From the above, we can note that al-Barbahari seems to have been
a trouble-maker with a strong activist invocation. He must have
considered himself superior, and he and his followers actively displayed
contempt for others. His behavior attempted to construct authority in
religious and moral terms, where the forbidding of wrong was to be
active and hands on, and the correction of others an obligation.
Considering the situation of the populace in Baghdad and the increasing
inﬂuence of Shiites, this does not appear as strange. However, it seems
that it was rather al-Khallal who “won” the Traditionalist internal battle
of the 10th century, and inﬂuenced later developments. His view on
correction has since inﬂuenced Hanbali interpretations, and due to him,
Traditionalism as a madhhab developed. This may well be the result of
realizing pragmatically that the rioting of the Barbaharians did not have
a future, and in order to preserve Traditionalism it was necessary to
adopt a more lenient strategy, which would not cause the authorities too
much concern.
This relation to the political authorities is an explanation to why the
passive stance became dominant. As seen, Ibn Hanbal avoided the
authorities as much as he could. He, like al-Khallal, advocated forbidd-
ing of wrong with the heart, and a kind of “passive resistance” which
seems to have been rather pleasing, or at least not disturbing, to the po-
litical authorities. Such Hanbalis demanded loyalty to, or even
avoidance of, the authorities. As time went on, more Hanbalis were
drawn into the caliphal bureaucracy as judges and advisors, which seem
to have strengthened the passive political stance and the stress on loyalty
towards the authorities, as well as the strategy of passive correction
being conducted mainly “with the heart”. Such an attitude did not cons-
titute a threat to the political authorities and it appears to have become
the established consensus concerning the forbidding of wrong among
Hanbalis. And thus, Hanbalism developed into a tradition like the other
madhāhib. That the Barbaharians were rioting in Baghdad appears to
have been an exception to this dominant passive interpretation of for-
bidding wrong, and it must be explained by the persona of al-Barbahari,
who managed to gather followers among the urban masses who were
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neither pleased with their situation at large, nor with the weakening
‘Abbasid caliphate and increasing Shiite inﬂuences. 
One explanation to the changes in attitude to the duty of forbidding
wrong between Ibn Hanbal and the Barbaharians of the 10th century
may simply be the increase of the number of Hanbalis, which most
likely increased their conﬁdence. Cook refers to the geographer Muq-
addasi (ca 945/946–991) who stated that Shiites and Hanbalis
dominated Baghdad’s population in the second half of the 10th century.
One century later, the Shaﬁ‘ite Nizam al-Mulk (1017–1092), a very in-
ﬂuential vizier in the Seljuq empire, admitted that Hanbalis were
predominant. Moreover, one explanation is that the ‘Abbasid state was
in a continuous decline during both the Buyids and the later Seljuqs
who had usurped the actual power. In this context, the Hanbalis and the
declining ‘Abbasid caliphate were in need of each other facing these
rival Shiite powers. One indication of the new relationship to the court
is that Hanbalis did accept taking public ofﬁce, which, as we have seen,
was not the case of Ibn Hanbal and most of the Hanbalis of the 10th
century. The close connections lasted until the fall of the ‘Abbasids
(Cook 2001:121–126). Cook further notes that the closer the alignment
between the Hanbalis and the ‘Abbasid court, the less talk about the
duty of forbidding wrong appears in the sources (Cook 2001:127–128). 
As a ﬁnal comment, we can note that the duty to forbid wrong has
resurfaced recently. There has been an increase in anti-Shiite polemics
from Sunni Muslims, especially those adhering to Wahhabism or forms
of Hanbali inspired fundamentalism (see for example Abdo 2013; Lars-
son 2016; Linge 2016; Maréchal & Zemni 2013; Olsson 2017a; Stein-
berg 2011). What is noticeable is that the method of forbidding of wrong
is promoted by the majority as ideally being “in the heart” or “with the
tongue” (in a civil manner), which is a method in line with the examples
of Ibn Hanbal as portrayed in the biographical notes, as well as the
views collected by al-Khallal. In some cases the forbidding of wrong is
promoted as “with the hands”, as within the frames of the Islamic State
and other similarly violently inclined groups. We can also note that
among apolitical Salaﬁs today, al-Barbahari’s Sharh al-sunnah is used
131
1/2018
to identify what a good lifestyle is and how to relate to others, not be-
longing to the in-group. As mentioned, Sharh al-sunnah promotes for-
bidding of wrongs as mainly an act “in the heart”. In such groups, no
attention seems to be payed to historiographies or what kind of
correction al-Barbahari in fact committed in practice. Hence, even al-
Barbahari is used today as promoting the forbidding of wrong rather as
a method of distancing oneself from wrong and condemning
wrongdoers in the heart (Olsson 2017b).
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ABSTRACT
The article focuses on the formative period of juridical traditions in the
‘Abbasid city of Baghdad. Ibn Hanbal (d. 855) was an early important
Traditionalist, who practiced a passive resistance towards those he
considered to hold faulty beliefs, or was considered guilty of faulty
conduct. The focus of the article is the conﬂictual situation that can be
related to conﬂicts of interpretative authority, especially regarding the
duty of forbidding wrong, not the least during the 10th century, when
several conﬂicts lead to social upheaval and violent conﬂict, for
example during the lead of al-Barbahari (d. 941). The political, social
and economic situation in the city of Baghdad is the context and
functions as an explanatory background to the conﬂicts of inter-
pretations between various Islamic factions. Following the violence and
turbulence addressed in the article, a comment is made on the reasons
as to why a more passive form of correction when forbidding wrong
became the dominant strategy, which was promoted and practiced by,
amongst others Abu Bakr al-Khallal (d. 923). One explanation is the
pragmatic realization that rioting did not have a future, and in order to
preserve Traditionalism it was necessary to adopt a more lenient
strategy, which would not cause the caliph too much concern.
KEYWORDS: Traditionalism, Hanbalis, forbidding wrong, Baghdad
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